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Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
14.1    Introduction
China has achieved remarkable success in attracting foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) since the early 1990s. It became the largest recipient of FDI 
among developing economies for the ﬁ  rst time in 1993 and then became one 
of the top three recipients of FDI in the world in 2003 to 2005 and number 
four in 2006 based on preliminary estimates.1 Perhaps as a reﬂ  ection of this 
success, there are many papers written on the various aspects of China’s 
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1. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2004 (annex table B.1, 367 and 370), in 
2003, China’s inward FDI of US$53.5 billion ranked number one, before both France (US$47 
billion) and the United States (US$29.8 billion), the second and third largest recipients of FDI 
in that year. However, in the World Investment Report 2005 (annex table B.1, 303), the U.S. ﬁ  gure 
for 2003 was revised to become US$56.8 billion, implying that China would rank number two 
in that year after the United States. In 2004, China’s inward FDI (US$60.6 billion) ranked 
number three after the United States (US$95.9 billion) and the United Kingdom (US$78.4 
billion). According to UNCTAD Investment Brief Number 1 2007, China was ranked number 
two (after the United States) in 2004, number three (after the United Kingdom and the United 
States) in 2005, and number four (after the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) 
in 2006. The 2006 data were preliminary estimates.)546        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
2. Even though Shanghai Automotive started to have some cooperative arrangements with 
MG Rover involving intellectual property rights, in the end, the British automaker was sold to 
Nanjing Automotive after the former went into bankruptcy (http://www.zydg.net/magazine/
article/1671- 4725/2005/16/222961.html).
inward FDI. In contrast, China’s outward FDI up to now is small and, thus, 
not as much systematic research has been carried out.
Nevertheless, as China is rapidly integrating with the global economy, 
its outward FDI has picked up in recent years. More important, perhaps, 
several major acquisition eﬀorts have brought media attention to China as 
a source of FDI. Among them, Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM PC announced 
in December 2004 could arguably be the most eye-  catching example of 
these eﬀorts. The other highly visible cases included the electronic appli-
ance manufacturer TCL’s acquisition of France’s Thomson Electronics in 
2004, white-  goods manufacturer Haier’s building of plants in the United 
States since the late 1990s, China’s third- largest oil producer China National 
Oﬀshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) failed attempt to acquire U.S. oil 
company UNOCAL in 2005, and Nanjing Automotive’s success in acquir-
ing the United Kingdom’s MG Rover Group in 2005.2 The energy crunch 
in 2006 also witnessed numerous stories about China’s eﬀort to invest in oil 
companies in the world, in particular in Russia, Central Asia, and Africa, 
giving an impression that resource grabbing was a key driving force behind 
China’s outward FDI.
14.1.1    Background
A description of China’s outward FDI from 1979 to 1996 can be found 
in Cai (1999). The country’s annual FDI outﬂ  ow grew from virtually zero in 
1979, when China embarked upon its open-  door policy, to US$628 million 
in 1985, and to US$913 million in 1991, before shooting up to US$4 billion 
in 1992, the year in which China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping made 
an important tour to South China to reaﬃrm China’s commitment to its 
reform and open- door policy in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown 
in 1989.
By the end of 1996, China’s total stock of FDI outﬂ  ows was over US$18 
billion. It surpassed South Korea (US$13.8 billion) and Brazil (US$7.4 bil-
lion) to move up to the number four position among developing economies, 
behind Hong Kong (US$112 billion), Singapore (US$37 billion), and Tai-
wan (US$27 billion; Cai, 1999, 861).
In the period of 1979 to 1993, almost two- thirds of China’s FDI was made 
in Asia, including 61 percent in Hong Kong and Macau. The other regions 
in descending order were North America (15 percent), Oceania (8 percent), 
Central and Eastern Europe (5 percent), Africa (2 percent), Latin America 
(2 percent), and Western Europe (2 percent; Cai 1999, p. 864). Nearly 60 
percent of China’s FDI up to 1994 was in the services sector, mainly to ser-
vice and promote its exports. The remaining FDI was in natural resources China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 4 7
3. As indicated in Cai (1999, 857), some argued that the actual stock of FDI outﬂ  ows from 
the beginning of China’s open-  door policy to the late 1990s were between US$80 billion and 
US$100 billion, even though only US$15 billion was oﬃcially approved.
(25 percent) and manufacturing (15 percent, mainly in textiles and clothing 
and other labor-  intensive industries, located primarily in Africa, Asia, and 
the Paciﬁ  c.
The FDI statistics used by Cai were provided by the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and collected by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) based on balance-  of-  payments account-
ing. Relative to the UNCTAD statistics, outward FDI statistics provided 
occasionally by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and its predecessor 
MOFTEC up to 2002 represented serious underestimates.3 Among other 
things, MOFCOM excluded investment projects not screened and approved 
by relevant government agencies and did not include investment made after 
the projects’ initial approval, such as the plough back of retained earnings. 
However, as part of China’s policy of encouraging its ﬁ  rms to go over-
seas, from 2002 onward, MOFCOM’s FDI statistics have been collected in 
accordance with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) deﬁ  nitions and IMF’s balance-  of-  payments guidelines. Thus, if 
there were still discrepancies between MOFCOM and UNCTAD’s FDI sta-
tistics, the discrepancies from 2003 onward should be smaller than before.
Hong and Sun (2004), also using UNCTAD’s FDI statistics, reported that 
the stock of China’s outward FDI reached about US$36 billion by end the 
of 2002, ranked number six among 118 developing economies. They found 
that the growth of China’s aggregate FDI outﬂ  ows during 1988 to 2002 were 
quite similar to those of South Korea during the same period and to Japan’s 
outﬂ  ows in the period of 1968 to 1982. The sector composition of China’s 
FDI, with 40 to 50 percent of shares in the nontrade category, was similar to 
that of South Korea in the 1980s and that of Japan in the 1960s and 1970s.
Hong and Sun found that the motives, destination, ﬁ  nancing, and mode 
of entry of Chinese investors had undergone changes in the 1990s. For ex-
ample, even though natural resources were still an important motive, in the 
late 1990s, increasingly more Chinese ﬁ  rms used FDI to acquire advanced 
foreign technologies and managerial skills, which had the eﬀect of increasing 
their investment in the United States. Also, from 1992 to 2001, Chinese ﬁ  rms 
increasingly exploited and further developed their comparative advantages 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In 1997 to 2001, Africa, with a share 
of 24.1 percent, became the second largest regional destination of Chinese 
FDI outﬂ  ows, only after Asia. Since the mid- 1990s, more and more Chinese 
ﬁ  rms used listing in overseas stock markets (Hong Kong and New York) to 
raise equity capital and to enhance their international reputation. What they 
found most striking, however, was that mergers and acquisitions gradually 
became the main form of investing overseas.548        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
4. The ﬁ  gures quoted in news reports would not necessarily result in oﬃcial FDI statistics 
because the former often included the total value of planned investment over many years into 
the future, and some of the planned investment might not take place as planned. Let’s use two 
examples to compare the FDI statistics as reported in the 2005 Statistical Bulletin issued by 
China’s Ministry of Commerce against the statistics quoted in the newspaper reports. As an 
example, the total stock of Chinese FDI in Algeria by the end of 2005 as reported in the Bul-
letin was US$171 million, much less than the value of a single deal involving China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) as reported in Taylor (2009, 45): “In 2003 CNPC purchased a 
number of Algerian reﬁ  neries for $350 million and signed a deal to explore for oil in two blocks.” 
What could be the explanations of the big diﬀerence in FDI statistics besides misreporting on 
either side or on both sides? Did CNPC take a long time to implement its deal so that by the 
end of 2005 only a fraction of the transacted amount was actually invested? Or did CNPC sell 
part or all of its interests before the end of 2005? Or was part or all of the investment considered 
portfolio investment and, thus, not included as direct investment? As another example, accord-
ing to Taylor (2009, 50), China’s investment in Sudan was estimated at $4 billion. However, 
by the end of 2005, China’s oﬃcial statistics showed only a stock of US$352 million, which 
was even less than Taylor’s report of US$600 million that Sinopec and CNPC jointly paid in 
November 2005 for drilling rights to an oilﬁ  eld in the country.
14.1.2    Related  Literature
Because China is a developing economy and until the last few years had 
been generally short of capital and foreign exchange, its outward FDI 
requires some explanations. Cai (1999) identiﬁ  ed four motives for Chi-
nese FDI: (a) market; (b) natural resources; (c) technology and managerial 
skills; and (d) ﬁ  nancial capital. These motives were later augmented by other 
researchers. For instance, Deng (2004) identiﬁ  ed two additional motives: 
(e) strategic assets (e.g., brands, marketing networks), and (f) diversiﬁ  cation. 
Clearly, because China was itself a low- cost production base, cost minimiza-
tion was not a major motivation of Chinese FDI overseas.
Alternative routes taken by China and its national ﬁ  rms to acquire the pre-
ceding assets and resources have received attention in ﬁ  elds of international 
business and politics. For example, Child and Rodrigues (2005), on the basis 
of case studies, examined the pros and cons of three alternative routes taken 
by Chinese ﬁ  rms in seeking technological and brand assets: (a) acting as an 
original equipment manufacturing (OEM) ﬁ  rm and forming joint ventures 
with foreign ﬁ  rms; (b) mergers with and acquisitions of foreign ﬁ  rms; and 
(c) organic international expansion (i.e., green ﬁ  eld investment overseas).
As a world factory, China will become increasingly more dependent on 
the global supply of raw materials and energy, and China’s FDI in natural 
resources seems to have captured the world’s imagination. There were many 
reports of billion dollar deals in 2006 and 2007 involving oil-  producing 
African countries (e.g., Taylor 2009), central Asian countries (e.g., Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, October 27, 2006), and elsewhere. This impression 
of foreign investment activities in natural resources indeed found support 
in the FDI statistics, which shows that China made US$8.54 billion in 2006 
in “mining, quarrying, and petroleum,” accounting for 40.4 percent of the 
country’s total FDI in that year.4 However, the gap between oﬃcial statistics 
and ﬁ  gures found in news reports appears to be big.China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 4 9
5. According to Taylor (2009, 39), China surpassed Japan in 2003 to become the world’s 
second largest user of oil products after the U.S.
As a reﬂ  ection of Chinese eﬀort to secure the supply of raw materials 
and energy for its national economy, there is a literature on “resource diplo-
macy,” which was, according to Zweig (2006, 2), deﬁ  ned as “diplomatic 
activity designed to enhance a nation’s access to resources and its energy 
security.” While the ﬁ  rst and foremost resource sought after by China is 
oil, the country is also in great demand for other minerals such as copper, 
bauxite, uranium, aluminum, manganese, iron ore, and so on (see, e.g., Tay-
lor 2009, 37).5 As pointed out by Taylor, “the strategy chosen is basically to 
acquire foreign energy resources via long- term contracts as well as purchas-
ing overseas assets in the energy industry” (37). These strategic choices also 
apply to other key natural resources. After a systematic analysis of China’s 
FDI statistics, we shall highlight its investment in the energy sector.
Using statistics on approved outward FDI as published in the Almanac of 
China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade from 1991 to 2005, Cheung 
and Qian (2007) found that, consistent with the earlier literature, China’s 
investment was motivated by both market-  seeking and resource-  seeking. 
However, they did not ﬁ  nd substantial evidence that its investment in Afri-
can and oil-  producing countries was mainly for their natural resources. 
In addition, they found that China’s international reserves and exports to 
developing countries tended to promote FDI; the latter ﬁ  nding suggests that 
some investment in developing countries could be either for the purpose of 
facilitating or complementing exports.
Researchers in the ﬁ  elds of international business and politics recognize 
the importance of the role of the Chinese government in China’s outward 
FDI. This point would not be hard to appreciate because, as we shall see 
in the following, until now the lion’s share of China’s outward FDI has 
been made by ﬁ  rms that have close relationships to various levels of gov-
ernment. Moreover, overseas investment by Chinese private ﬁ  rms requires 
government approval. Partly as a result of the perceived need to secure key 
natural resources and technologies through ownership, and partly due to 
the awareness that Chinese ﬁ  rms must compete in the global arena when 
foreign ﬁ  rms intensify their entry into the domestic market, China started 
to initiate a policy to encourage its national ﬁ  rms to “go overseas” in 2001. 
The government not only relaxed the approval process of outward FDI, but 
also provided incentives for FDI in target industries and recipient countries. 
This policy shift toward outward FDI will be further discussed in the fol-
lowing.
Stimulated by international attention on some successes and failed 
attempts of buyout by Chinese multinational ﬁ  rms, Antkiewicz and Whalley 
(2006) discussed three policy issues about cross-  border mergers and acqui-
sitions. They were (a) government subsidization of cross-  border mergers 
and acquisitions; (b) transparency of the acquiring ﬁ  rms; and (c) national 550        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
security concerns of OECD countries whose ﬁ  rms are the targets of foreign 
buyouts.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold: (a) to provide a brief introduction 
to China’s “go overseas” policy; (b) to provide a systematic analysis of the 
size and composition of China’s outward FDI in 2003 to 2006, the period 
over which such data are available from China’s Ministry of Commerce; (c) 
to uncover the determinants of the amounts of China’s outward FDI to the 
host economies, and (d) to shed light on China’s past and future outward 
FDI by analyzing the determinants of the amounts of the outward FDI of 
the world’s source economies and those of Japan and South Korea to yield 
an East Asian perspective.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes China’s 
“go overseas” policy ﬁ  rst proclaimed in 2001, to be followed by section 
14.3, which analyzes the pattern of China’s outward FDI in 2003 to 2006, 
including the total amounts, sector composition, geographical distribution, 
and the identity of investing ﬁ  rms. Section 14.4 discusses China’s foreign 
investment in the energy sector, while section 14.5 attempts to uncover the 
determinants of the amounts of China’s outward FDI in the host economies 
with the help of gravity equation regression analysis. Section 14.6 examines 
the determinants of the total amounts of outward FDI of the world’s source 
economies, with a particular focus on Japan and South Korea’s experience, 
to shed light on China’s past and future FDI. Section 14.7 compares China 
sector composition and geographical distribution of FDI against those of 
Japan and South Korea. The ﬁ  nal section summarizes and indicates direc-
tions for further research.
14.2      China’s “Go Overseas” Policy toward Outward FDI
The Chinese government ﬁ  rst proposed Chinese ﬁ  rms to “go overseas” 
(“zouchuqu” literally means “go out” but may be taken to mean “go global” 
as some authors have done) in 2001 in its 10th Five-  Year plan. In the sixth 
national congress of the China Communist Party (CCP) in 2002, Presi-
dent Jiang Zeming proclaimed the go overseas policy, which covers FDI, 
the undertaking of foreign construction and engineering projects, and the 
export of Chinese employment or labor services. Due to lack of publicly 
available information, however, it is diﬃcult to provide a complete catalogue 
of speciﬁ  c measures that have been introduced under the go overseas policy. 
It is known that in the initial stage of the policy’s introduction, policy mea-
sures were mainly in the form of relaxation of restrictions on investment 
overseas, including the vetting and approval of such investment, plus some 
minor ﬁ  nancial support.
In January 2004, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, 
and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange promulgated a series of 
measures that aimed to promote Chinese investment overseas in goods pro-China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 5 1
6. The Ministry of Commerce compiled a list of countries suitable for investment in textile 
and consumer electronics as early as January 2004.
cessing (including export processing). Among other things, the vetting and 
approval of investment of US$3 million or less were delegated to provincial 
level government agencies, while project proposal and feasibility study no 
longer required approval. In addition, a “Central Foreign Trade Develop-
ment Fund” of RMB2.3 billion was set up to support investment in overseas 
processing activities, and both the scope and proportion of interest payment 
subsidy were increased. For nonﬁ  nance, nonprocessing FDI, the approval 
of foreign investment projects was delegated to local authorities at twelve 
coastal Chinese cities.
In addition to policies in support of FDI, funds were also set up to sup-
port Chinese ﬁ  rms in bidding for foreign construction or engineering proj-
ects, in the form of subsidy for project ﬁ  nance and insurance.
To promote Chinese ﬁ  rms to go overseas, a wide variety of services was 
provided by the government, ranging from promoting national ﬁ  rms during 
oﬃcial visits by government oﬃcials and state leaders, to incorporating busi-
ness negotiations into intergovernmental cooperation frameworks, to build-
ing databases on investment environment and opportunities in speciﬁ  c host 
countries, to providing consultancy services to Chinese ﬁ  rms that consider 
overseas investment.6 Furthermore, in addition to the central government 
and its overseas oﬃces, local governments were also involved in supporting 
investment overseas. Government agencies worked closely with investing 
ﬁ  rms and industry associations to promote the investing ﬁ  rms’ interests. 
Both policy banks and commercial banks were involved in assisting the 
ﬁ  nance of overseas activities, including FDI.
A regular mechanism was set up by the Ministry of Commerce in associa-
tion with All- China Federation of Industry and Commerce as early as May 
2004 to encourage private ﬁ  rms to go overseas, and a draft document that 
surfaced in 2006 called for stronger support for non-  state-  owned ﬁ  rms in 
the areas of taxation, ﬁ  nance, foreign exchange, and insurance. An example 
was the facilitation of obtaining ﬁ  nance from the global capital market, 
including listing in overseas stock markets, debt issuing, project ﬁ  nance, and 
guarantee for overseas subsidiaries.
Despite the government’s early eﬀort to encourage non- state- owned ﬁ  rms 
to go overseas, the policy measures eﬀectiveness was unclear. Some private 
Chinese ﬁ  rms felt that by 2006, government restrictions on their going over-
seas were largely gone, but they had not seen any helping hand yet. Govern-
ment oﬃcials in the Ministry of Commerce felt that there were already many 
policy measures to assist the private ﬁ  rms (such as interest subsidies and 
deductibility of the cost of feasibility studies in the case of natural resource 
development), but the ﬁ  rms did not utilize them due to lack of information. 
According to some researchers in the government, while there were many 552        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
7. The information is taken from an article posted at http://mnc.people.com.cn/GB/
54824/5127355.html.
such promotional measures, their eﬀectiveness was limited. It is interesting 
that the same researchers also questioned the rationale for subsidizing out-
ward FDI with taxpayers’ money.
Other private ﬁ  rms felt that they were not free to make quick investment 
decisions in a rapidly changing world economy. They complained that the 
investment facilitating measures were unclear and the approval of overseas 
investment project proposals still took a long time. Instead of going through 
successive levels of the Ministry of Commerce, then to the Commission 
on Development and Reform, and ﬁ  nally to the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange, Chinese private ﬁ  rms wanted to have a one-  stop shop 
to get all the required approvals. Some other private ﬁ  rms complained that, 
on the one hand, they were unable to obtain long-  term loans from policy 
banks due to quotas on total lending and, on the other hand, commercial 
banks were not willing to take any risk in longer-  term lending. Obtaining 
ﬁ  nance overseas with domestic collateral was not permitted by the Chinese 
government, but some private ﬁ  rms did it illegally anyway.
In 2006, China started to explore the idea of setting up “overseas China 
economic and trade cooperation zones” in host countries. These zones were 
perceived to serve several purposes: (a) to expand exports through the host 
economies that satisfy rules of origin in order to lessen bilateral trade fric-
tions caused by rapid increase in Chinese exports; (b) to develop Chinese 
ﬁ  rms and to build Chinese brands in the global market place; (c) to reduce 
the country’s bursting foreign reserves, and (d) to provide employment in 
host countries, thus contributing to the host economies and bilateral rela-
tions.
The reason for encouraging Chinese ﬁ  rms to invest in these zones rather 
than in other locations in the host countries is that Chinese ﬁ  rms would be 
more eﬀective when they go overseas in groups, rather than as individual 
ﬁ  rms. That way, they will be able to support each other and to enjoy better 
support by host governments. In addition, the terms of agreement reached 
between host governments and Chinese investing ﬁ  rms will be ﬁ  rmed up as 
part of the bilateral investment agreements between the Chinese and host 
governments.
The hosts for these zones are chosen mostly on the basis of good bilateral 
relations, political stability, and comparative advantages. The host countries 
include North Korea, Russia, Kazakstan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. China envi-
sions building ﬁ  fty or so zones in the near future. By the end of November 
2007, eight zones were approved, and one was oﬃcially established. Each 
approved zone may get RMB200 to 300 million of ﬁ  scal support and up to 
RMB2 billion of medium-   to long-  term loans. The following are examples 
of such zones:7China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 5 3
8. In terms of the number of FIEs, by the end of 2006, 95 percent of them were subsidiaries 
and representative oﬃces, while joint ventures accounted for only 5 percent.
1. Haier-  Ruba Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Pakistan: 
Oﬃcially established in November 2006, this is an industrial park mainly 
for the production of consumer electronics;
2.  Ussuriysk Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Russia: Oﬃcially 
approved in October 2006, it focuses mainly on lumber, textiles, and logis-
tics.
3. Lake Tai International Economic Cooperation Zone in Cambodia: 
It is mainly a regional trade center for distribution of goods produced in 
China’s Jiangsu Province.
4.  China Nonferrous Metal Group to invest in nonferrous mines in Zam-
bia, especially in the Chambishi copper mine.
5. Transbaikai Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in the area of 
Transbaikai, Chita, on the China-  Russia border: It is mainly for industrial 
processing and cross-  border trade.
14.3      Patterns of China’s Recent Outward FDI
From this point onward, we shall omit the adjective “outward” if the 
meaning of FDI is clear without it. In this section, we ﬁ  rst present China’s 
aggregate annual FDI ﬂ  ow from 1982 to 2006 and its global shares in aggre-
gate ﬂ  ows and stocks from 2002 to 2006. After that, we shall examine the 
sector composition and geographical distribution of China’s FDI ﬂ  ows and 
stocks, to be followed by an analysis of the organizational background of 
the Chinese investors. Note that the diﬀerence between the FDI stocks (mea-
sured as of end of year) of two successive years is not necessarily equal to 
the FDI ﬂ  ow of the later year, as one might expect, due to reasons such as 
revaluations of the stock of investment.
14.3.1      Amounts and Global Shares
By the end of 2006, more than 5,000 Chinese ﬁ  rms had established nearly 
10,000 overseas subsidiaries, joint ventures, and representative oﬃces in 172 
countries (regions) around the world.8 The ﬂ  ow of China’s FDI from 1990 to 
2006 is depicted in ﬁ  gure 14.1, where the data from 1982 to 2001 were based 
on UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports, while data from 2002 were pro-
vided by MOFCOM based on international deﬁ  nitions and data collection 
methods. Note that statistics for FDI in ﬁ  nancial industries in 2002 to 2005 
was not available. To maintain consistency, the total FDI for 2006 shown 
in the ﬁ  gure excluded FDI in ﬁ  nancial industries, whose statistics became 
available for the ﬁ  rst time in that year.
In 2006, China’s total FDI ﬂ  ow amounted to US$21.16 billion, 24.4 per-
cent of which was made up of new equity investment, and 31.4 percent of 554        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
9. By the end of 2006, Chinese state-  owned commercial banks established a total of forty-
  seven branches, thirty-  one subsidiaries, and twelve representative oﬃces in twenty-  nine coun-
tries and regions, including the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The banking 
industry accounted for the lion’s share of that year’s FDI in the ﬁ  nancial industries: 71 percent 
of ﬂ  ow and 79 percent of stock; insurance, second in place, accounted for 5 percent of the 
stock.
which was made up of reinvestment of current proﬁ  ts. From a diﬀerent 
angle, 39 percent of the total FDI took the form of merger of acquisition 
(M&A), and 35.4 percent of FDI in ﬁ  nancial industries took the form of 
M&A. In addition, about half of the nonﬁ  nance FDI was in the form of 
loans extended by parent companies in China to its overseas units.
In 2002 to 2005, statistics for FDI in ﬁ  nancial industries such as banking 
and insurance was not included due to lack of data, so the total amounts 
of shown in the ﬁ  gure were underestimates of China’s actual FDI. In 2006, 
when statistics on FDI in ﬁ  nancial industries became available for the ﬁ  rst 
time, such FDI accounted for about one-  sixth of the ﬂ  ow in that year and 
the stock at the end of the same year.9 If the shares of ﬁ  nancial industries in 
China’s total FDI ﬂ  ow and stock in 2006 were indicative of their importance 
in earlier years, then the statistics from 2002 to 2005 should be adjusted 
upward by about 17 percent.
China’s FDI ﬂ  ow in nonﬁ  nance industries, on average, grew by 59.5 
percent per annum (compound) between 2002 and 2006; its FDI stocks 
in the nonﬁ  nance industries, on average, grew by 34.5 percent per annum 
Fig. 14.1    China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow: 1982–2006 (US$ millions)
Source: Ministry of Commerce, China (2006, 2007). Data for 1982–2001 are based on various 
issues of UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, whereas data for 2002–2006 were compiled by 
the ministry.China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 5 5
(compound). Despite such rapid growth, its shares of the world’s total FDI 
remained very small. As shown in table 14.1, China’s FDI ﬂ  ow in 2006 
accounted for about 1.74 percent of the world’s total FDI ﬂ  ow and 0.73 
percent of the world’s total FDI stock. The ﬁ  gures in the earlier years were 
even smaller, and any adjustment to account for FDI in ﬁ  nancial industries 
would not have made any signiﬁ  cant diﬀerence.
When compared against the 2006 FDI statistics of other countries, the 
amounts of China’s FDI ﬂ  ow and stock in 2006 would rank number seven-
teen and number twenty-  four, respectively. Not only the world’s major 
industrial economies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France, but also some of the small developed economies and major develop-
ing economies had more FDI than China. As examples of the latter, China’s 
FDI ﬂ  ow in 2006 (US$21.16 billion) was below that of Hong Kong (US$43.5 
billion), Sweden (US$24.6 billion), and Holland (US$22.7 billion) in the 
same year. Its FDI stock in 2006 (US$90.63 billion) was below that of Hol-
land, Australia, Ireland, Denmark, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Russia.
Nevertheless, given the expectation that China’s FDI ﬂ  ows in the future 
will continue to grow rapidly relative to other source economies, it would be 
reasonable to expect China’s rankings to continue to move up further.
14.3.2    Sector  Composition
China’s FDI ﬂ  ows and stocks in 2003 to 2006 by sector are shown in 
table 14.2. In 2006, 53.8 percent of China’s FDI ﬂ  ow went into the services 
Table 14.1  China’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂ  ows and stocks in relation to the 
world’s total FDI ﬂ  ows and stocks
    2002   2003   2004   2005   2006
China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow 
(U.S.$ billions) 2.7 2.85 5.5 12.26 21.16
World’s total FDI ﬂ  ow 
(U.S.$ billions) 540.7 560.1 877.3 837.2 1215.8
Global share (%) 0.50 0.51 0.63 1.46 1.74
China’s outward FDI stock 
(U.S.$ billions) 22.9 33.2 44.8 57.2 90.63
World’s total FDI stock 
(U.S.$ billions) 7,433.9 8,779.5 10,151.8 10,578.8 12,474.3
Global share (%)   0.31   0.38   0.44   0.54   0.73
Notes: Stocks were measured at the end of each calendar year. The FDI ﬂ  ow and stock ﬁ  gures for 
2003–2005 were underestimates of China’s actual outward FDI ﬂ  ows and stocks because before 2006, 
FDI in ﬁ  nancial industries were not included. In 2006, when data became available, FDI in ﬁ  nancial in-
dustries accounted for about one- sixth of China’s total FDI ﬂ  ow and stock in 2006. The global shares of 
China’s FDI ﬂ  ows and stocks reported in this table are slightly diﬀerent from those reported in the Min-
istry of Commerce’s Statistical Bulletins, where the shares were calculated as percentages of China’s ﬂ  ows 
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10. This is mainly telecom equipment, computers and other electronic equipment, textile, 
electro-  mechanical manufacture, transportation equipment, lumber processing, nonferrous 
metal, and so on.
industries; 40.4 percent went into mining and petroleum; and a miniscule 
4.3 percent went into manufacturing.10 Within the services sector, 21.4 per-
cent went into business services, 16.8 percent into ﬁ  nance, 6.5 percent into 
transportation and storage (mainly marine transportation), and 5.3 percent 
into wholesale and retail (mainly imports and exports).
By the end of 2006, business services accounted for the largest share of 
China’s outward FDI stock (21.5 percent), to be followed by mining and 
petroleum (19.8 percent), ﬁ  nance (17.2 percent), wholesale and retail (14.3 
percent), transportation and storage (8.4 percent), and manufacturing (8.3 
percent).
Due to the inclusion of ﬁ  nance for the ﬁ  rst time in 2006, the shares of 
most of the other industries in 2006 inevitably fell from their 2005 levels. It 
is interesting to note that the total shares of the services sector in total FDI 
stock varied from the over 70 percent in 2003 to 2005 to close to 69 percent 
in 2006, signifying the predominant importance of the sector in China’s 
FDI.
14.3.3    Geographical  Distribution
In 2006, China’s FDI ﬂ  owed into 172 countries and regions spread over all 
continents except the Antarctica. Tables 14.3 and 14.4 show the geographi-
cal distributions of China’s nonﬁ  nance FDI ﬂ  ows and stocks, respectively. 
In 2006, 48.0 percent of China’s FDI ﬂ  ow was destined for Latin America, 
which exceeded the share of Asia, a new development that began in 2005. 
The bulk of China’s investment in Latin America was made in two tax havens 
there: Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands; the other well- known tax 
haven, the Bahamas, played a much smaller role. Investment in these and 
other tax havens typically results in reinvestment in other host economies, 
including China itself.
Until 2004, Asian economies accounted for more than half of China’s 
investment ﬂ  ows. However, the share of Asia declined to 35.7 percent and 
43.5 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively, as investment shifted to Latin 
America. Despite this recent slow down, however, Asia still accounted for 
64 percent of the total stock of China’s FDI by the end of 2006, with 88 
percent of it going to Hong Kong. Clearly, China’s substantial FDI ﬂ  ows to 
Latin America were a relatively recent phenomenon.
The other regions in the world were not important destinations for China’s 
FDI at all. In every year from 2003 to 2006, together they accounted for less 
than 10 percent of China’s total ﬂ  ows and total stocks. Africa was slightly 
ahead of Europe in some years, but Europe was ahead of Africa in other 
years, and both accounted for more Chinese FDI than North America, 
whereas Oceania came in last. By the end of 2006, the shares of Africa, 558        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
Europe, North America, and Oceania in China’s total nonﬁ  nance FDI stock 
were 3.4 percent, 3.0 percent, 2.1 percent, and 1.3 percent, respectively.
When compared with the shares of the world’s aggregate FDI ﬂ  ows to 
diﬀerent regions, tables 14.3 and 14.4 show that the shares of China’s FDI 
ﬂ  ows to Asia and Latin America were signiﬁ  cantly higher than those of the 
world’s, and its shares to Europe, North America, and Oceania were very 
low. In contrast, its share to Africa was more or less average, so the recent 
Chinese initiative to expand its economic role on the dark continent has yet 
to appear to the latter’s future FDI ﬁ  gures.
The top ten recipients of China’s FDI stock by the end of 2006 in descend-
ing order were Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, the 
United States, South Korea, Russia, Australia, Macau, Sudan, and Ger-
many. Immediately after them were Singapore, Mongolia, Kazakstan, Saudi 
Arabia, Zambia, Vietnam, Algeria, Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan. In 
Table 14.3  Values and shares of China’s nonﬁ  nance foreign direct investment (FDI) 
ﬂ  ows, by region
    2003   2004   2005   2006
Values of China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ows (U.S.$ millions)
Asia 1,498.95 3,000.27 4,374.64 7,663.25
Africa 74.79 317.42 391.68 519.86
Europe 151.14 170.92 505.02 597.71
Latin America 1,038.15 1,762.72 6,466.16 8,468.74
North America 57.74 126.49 320.84 258.05
Oceania 33.88 120.15 202.83 126.36
Share of China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ows (%)
Asia 52.51 54.57 35.68 43.46
Africa 2.62 5.77 3.19 2.95
Europe 5.29 3.11 4.12 3.39
Latin America 36.37 32.06 52.74 48.03
North America 2.02 2.30 2.62 1.46
Oceania 1.19 2.19 1.65 0.72
Relative ratio of China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ows
Asia 2.37 2.25 1.56 2.12
Africa 0.79 2.38 1.02 1.08
Europe 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07
Latin America 4.59 2.52 6.60 7.49
North America 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.08
Oceania   0.62   0.41   –0.47   0.29
Sources: China’s data from Ministry of Commerce, China (2004–2007); world’s data from 
UNCTAD’s FDI database.
Notes: Share of China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow to region  China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow to region/
China’s aggregate outward FDI ﬂ  ow. Relative ratio of China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow  share of 
China’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow to region/share of world’s FDI ﬂ  ow to region. The world’s outward 
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terms of FDI ﬂ  ows in 2006, the top ten recipients in descending order were 
Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, Russia, the United 
States, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Zambia. Immediately after 
them were Mongolia, Germany, Nigeria, Iran, Indonesia, Sudan, Vietnam, 
Kazakstan, South Africa, and Japan.
Both lists were indicative of the role of natural resources in attracting 
Chinese FDI to Africa, central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia.
Given that 86.8 percent of China’s total FDI ﬂ  ows in 2006 was made in 
three tax havens (namely, Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, and British Virgin 
Islands), and at least 80 percent and 78 percent of its FDI ﬂ  ow in 2005 and 
2004 were made in them, respectively, the true breakdown of the destination 
of China’s FDI was largely unknown. Our attempts to obtain information 
about China’s actual investment destinations from news databases and the 
annual reports of publicly listed Chinese companies, unfortunately, proved 
to be unsuccessful.
Table 14.4  Values and shares of China’s outward nonﬁ  nance foreign direct 
investment (FDI) stocks, by region
    2003   2004   2005   2006
Values of China’s outward FDI stocks (U.S.$ millions)
Asia 26,559.39 33,409.53 40,629.04 47,978.04
Africa 491.22 899.55 1,595.25 2,556.82
Europe 531.52 746.66 1,598.19 2,269.82
Latin America 4,619.34 8,268.37 11,469.62 19,694.37
North America 548.49 909.21 1,263.24 1,587.02
Oceania 472.26 543.94 650.28 939.48
Share of China’s outward FDI stocks (%)
Asia 79.94 74.61 71.02 63.95
Africa 1.48 2.01 2.79 3.41
Europe 1.60 1.67 2.79 3.03
Latin America 13.90 18.47 20.05 26.25
North America 1.65 2.03 2.21 2.12
Oceania 1.42 1.21 1.14 1.25
Relative ratios of China’s outward FDI stocks
Asia 5.16 4.91 4.28 3.69
Africa 0.60 0.80 1.03 1.30
Europe 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06
Latin America 1.83 2.47 2.47 3.47
North America 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11
Oceania   0.47  0.37  0.44  0.48
Sources: China’s data from Ministry of Commerce, China (2006); world’s data from 
UNCTAD’s FDI database.
Notes: Share of China’s outward FDI stock to region  China’s outward FDI stock to region/
China’s aggregate outward FDI stock. Relative ratio of China’s outward FDI to region  
share of China’s outward FDI stock to region/share of world’s FDI stock to region.560        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
11. In China, the provincial-level regions include provinces, provincial-  level autonomous 
regions, and provincial-  level municipalities directly administered under the central government.
12. In the 2006 list, Huawei and Haier replaced TCL and Beijing Jade Bird on the top thirty 
list.
13. For example, GDH Limited and Shum Yip Holdings Company Limited are from Guang-
dong, whereas Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation and Shanghai Baosteel Group 
Corporation are from Shanghai.
14. This agreement was reached in May 2004 when Brazil’s president Lula visited China. 
Under the agreement, China was to invest US$1 billion in a port facilities in return for Brazil’s 
iron ore, oil, bauxite, and other raw materials of equal total value.
14.3.4      Identity of Chinese Investors
The bulk of China’s FDI was made by the country’s state-  owned enter-
prises (SOEs), in particular, those large multinational companies that were 
administered by the Central Government’s ministries and agencies. The 
shares of FDI ﬂ  ows in 2003 to 2006 made by SOEs under the Central Gov-
ernment were 73.5 percent, 82.3 percent, 83.2 percent, and 86.4 percent, 
respectively. Their shares of FDI stocks by the end of 2004 to 2006 were 
85.5 percent, 83.5 percent, and 82.1 percent, respectively. The remaining 
shares of FDI ﬂ  ows and stocks were made by SOEs administered by regional 
governments and non- SOEs that are owned collectively and privately.11 The 
private ﬁ  rms’ share of FDI was miniscule; in 2004, private ﬁ  rms in China 
accounted for 1.5 percent of the country’s total FDI ﬂ  ow, and by the end of 
2006 their share of China’s total FDI stock was 1 percent.
At the end of 2004, the thirty Chinese multinational companies with the 
largest stocks of FDI accounted for 80.4 percent of China’s total nonﬁ  nance 
FDI stock. Over twenty of them were SOEs administered by the Central 
Government. The remainder included the listed companies Lenovo, TCL, 
Beida Jade Bird,12 and other listed companies that are owned by the regional 
governments of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong.13
14.4      China’s FDI in the Energy Sector
Despite frequent news reports on China’s FDI in the energy sector, no 
systematic data are available in the public domain. As pointed out in the 
preceding, China’s go overseas policy covers not only outward FDI, but also 
the undertaking of overseas construction and engineering projects as well 
as the export of labor services. China’s energy policy as stated in the 11th 
Five-  Year plan (2006–2010) was to develop domestic supply as the primary 
means of meeting domestic demand, and to supplement that supply by tap-
ping foreign sources of energy. To secure the foreign supply of oil, gas, and 
other forms of energy, China has relied on both long-  term contracts and 
FDI. In some cases, these contracts may go beyond the purchase and sale of 
oil and gas. For example, in an agreement reached in 2004, China swapped 
its construction projects for Brazil’s oil.14China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 6 1
15. The ratios of their market capitalization in 2007 were about 5:2:1.
China’s three biggest oil companies in descending order are China Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Chemical and Petroleum 
Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Oﬀshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC).15 In terms of the importance of overseas operations, the order 
is CNPC, CNOOC, and Sinopec.
China National Petroleum Corporation started its overseas ventures in 
1995. A decade later, it had four production bases in North Africa (mainly 
Sudan); Central Asia (mainly Kazakstan); South America (mainly Vene-
zuela); and Asia and Australia, with annual target production of 35 million 
tons. In 2006 it had sixty-  ﬁ  ve cooperative projects in twenty-  ﬁ  ve countries, 
producing 54 million tons of oil (of which 28 million tons went to the com-
pany) and 5.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas (of which 3.5 billion cubic 
meters went to the company).
In 2002, CNOOC acquired three oil/gas ﬁ  elds in Australia and Indone-
sia at the cost of US$1.2 billion, including oﬀshore oil ﬁ  elds in Indonesia 
that were acquired from Spain’s Repsol-  YPE; the latter oil ﬁ  elds yielded 
5.4 million tons of oil for the company. In 2006, it expanded its operations 
in Africa by acquiring a Nigerian tract at a cost of US$2.068 billion and 
signed an agreement with Kenya for the largest area ever obtained from its 
overseas agreements. In that year, it also reached an agreement with Viet-
nam to jointly develop oil in the South China Sea, received permission to 
participate in the second largest gas ﬁ  eld in Iran, and acquired a 25 percent 
stake in four oﬀshore exploration tracts in Australia.
Sinopec established its international subsidiary Sinopec International 
Petroleum Exploration and Production (SIPC) in 2001 for the purpose of 
going overseas. By 2005, it had oil and gas projects in Iran, Saudi Ara-
bia, Libya, Angola, Congo, Gabon, Kazakstan, Yemen, and Ecuador. In 
that year, it signed a joint venture agreement with the Russian oil company 
Rosneft to explore and develop oil and gas, the ﬁ  rst of its kind involving 
a Russian oil company and China’s three major oil companies. It also had 
activities in Australia and Indonesia. In 2006, it signed an agreement with 
Rosneft on a framework of strategic cooperation and joined forces with 
India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) to acquire a Columbian 
oil company.
An interview with some businessmen in Beijing has revealed that they 
were not aware of any government policies explicitly implemented to sup-
port Chinese ﬁ  rms in the energy sector to go overseas, but they could see 
three advantages the energy ﬁ  rms enjoy with regard to outward FDI. First, 
they have cooperated with foreign partners for a long time, so they are much 
more familiar with foreign countries than nonenergy ﬁ  rms. Second, they 
are SOEs (state-  owned enterprises), so they enjoy preferential policies that 
are speciﬁ  c to SOEs. Third, the energy ﬁ  rms they buy are good collateral 562        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
16. In theory, China’s exports to its host economies could be a factor in its outward FDI to 
them. However, the coeﬃcient of correlation between them was rather small. The coeﬃcient 
of correlation between China’s annual exports and FDI ﬂ  ow in 2003 to 2006 ranged from 0.3 
to 0.5; that between China’s annual exports and year end FDI stock ranged from 0.53 to 0.55 
during the same period. Due to these results, we have decided not to include China’s exports 
as an explanatory variable in the regression equation.
17. The estimation results are qualitatively similar whether the GDP of host economies was 
measured in nominal or real terms.
for loans, so banks are willing to ﬁ  nance their M&A activities overseas. 
Separately, Sinosure (China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation) has 
provided insurance to Chinese oil companies big and small in the areas of 
equity investment, debt ﬁ  nancing, and working capital loans.
To support Chinese oil companies going overseas, the Chinese govern-
ment has considered setting up a foreign exchange fund to facilitate the 
acquisition of and merger with foreign oil companies. However, whether this 
should be done remains controversial.
14.5      Determinants of China’s Outward FDI Flows 
and Stocks: A Gravity Model Analysis
The China Ministry of Commerce (2007) has released data on the FDI 
ﬂ  ows and stocks by destination in 2003 to 2006. There were 151 host econo-
mies in the sample for FDI ﬂ  ows and 172 host economies in the sample for 
FDI stocks. However, due to lack of macroeconomic data for many of these 
economies for some years, we are forced to use two substantially smaller 
subsamples, namely, a subsample of 90 to 98 host economies for ﬂ  ows and a 
subsample of 125 to 150 host economies for stocks, depending on the choice 
of our explanatory variables and their data availability. The gravity equation 
to be estimated for the purpose of uncovering the determinants of China’s 
outward FDI is as follows:16
log (FDIi,t)    1 • log(GDPi,t)  2 • log (PGDPi,t)  3 • log (disti) 
   4 • ChineseLangi  5 • Borderi  6 • Landlocki 
   7 • Islandi  8 • Dummyt,
where FDIit stands for China’s FDI ﬂ  ow to (or FDI stock in) economy i 
in year t, GDPit and PGDPit stand for the host economy’s real GDP and 
real per capita GDP, respectively;17 disti stands for the distance between the 
economy’s capital and Beijing, ChineseLangi is a dummy variable for the use 
of the Chinese language, Borderi stands for its sharing a common border 
with China, Landlocki indicates that it is a landlocked economy, and Islandi 
indicates that it is an island economy.
Because FDI that goes into tax havens and oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial centers will 
typically be invested elsewhere, these host economies are not the ultimate 
destination of the FDI. In order to avoid the inﬂ  uence of FDI that went 
to tax havens and oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial centers, we carried out the estimation China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 6 3
18. The OECD report listed thirty-  ﬁ  ve countries/regions as tax havens: Andorra, Anguilla, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, 
Cook Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey/Sark/Alderney, Isle of Man, Jersey, 
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, The Neth-
erlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, St Lucia, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Turks and Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Vanuatu.
19. The IMF report listed forty-  six countries/regions as oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial centers: Bah-
rain, Andorra, Aruba, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Belize, Anguilla, 
of the gravity equation ﬁ  rst by using the full sample and then by exclud-
ing them. Because there are many country lists of tax havens and oﬀshore 
ﬁ  nancial centers, we adopt the two most widely used lists, namely, the tax 
haven list issued by the OECD in 2000,18 and the oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial center 
list issued by the IMF in 2006.19
The estimation results of the gravity equation (except those for the time 
dummies) for FDI ﬂ  ows are reported in table 14.5, and those for FDI stocks 
are reported in table 14.6. It should be pointed out that the real GDP data 
for the entire period were taken from IMF’s World Economy Outlook, and 
Table 14.5  Regression results for recipient economies of China’s outward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) ﬂ  ows (2003–2006)
    Full sample  
Tax haven economies 
(OECD list) excluded  
Oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial 
center economies 
(IMF list) excludeda
log(GDP) 0.34782∗∗∗ 0.37272∗∗∗ 0.35160∗∗∗
(0.06634) (0.07164) (0.07252)
log(PGDP) –0.07953 –0.09717 –0.07004
(0.10504) (0.10908) (0.11214)




Border 1.12032∗∗∗ 0.98454∗∗ 0.83061∗∗
(0.39081) (0.38849) (0.39380)
Landlock –0.59648∗∗ –0.57681∗∗ –0.53456∗
(0.27200) (0.26986) (0.27474)
Island –0.19364 –0.35730 –0.37500
(0.30334) (0.31798) (0.35283)
R2 0.3087 0.3212 0.2364
No. of observations  392   375   362
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. OECD  Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development.
aBecause Hong Kong, Macau, and Singapore appeared on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) list, and Taiwan had no FDI from China, the ChineseLang dummy became irrelevant 
for the sample that excluded oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial center economies.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.564        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
Grenada, Ireland, Bermuda, Antigua and Barbuda, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, 
Bahamas, Malaysia (Labuan), Malta, Cyprus, Barbados, Marshall Islands, Switzerland, 
Gibraltar, British Virgin Islands, Nauru, Guernsey, Cook Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
Isle of Man, Costa Rica, Jersey, Dominica, Macao SAR, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, The Neth-
erlands Antilles, Monaco, Niue, Montserrat, Palau, Samoa, Panama, Seychelles, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Singapore, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Vanuatu.
20. But the coeﬃcient for the GDP variable was not statistically signiﬁ  cant when the full 
sample was used, that is, when the inﬂ  uence of tax havens was not controlled for.
similar estimation results were obtained when the real GDP data for 2003 
and 2004 were substituted with real GDP data from the Penn World Tables, 
which do not have data for 2005 and 2006.
The results in table 14.5 reveal that, as expected, the host economies’ GDP 
had a positive impact, whereas their respective distances from China had 
a negative impact on attracting China’s FDI.20 The landlocked economies 
seemed to be at a disadvantage in attracting Chinese FDI, while sharing a 
common border with China (which included some landlocked economies) 
was a positive factor in attracting China’s FDI. While the use of the Chinese 
language had a positive impact on China’s FDI, there were only four such 
Table 14.6  Regression results for recipient economies of China’s outward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) stocks (2003–2006)
    Full sample  
Tax haven countries 
(OECD list) excluded  
Oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial 
center countries 
(IMF list) excludeda
log(GDP) 0.62499∗∗∗ 0.70896∗∗∗ 0.67533∗∗∗
(0.05363) (0.06023) (0.05803)
log(PGDP) –0.56010∗∗∗ –0.64311∗∗∗ –0.62610∗∗∗
(0.08950) (0.09454) (0.09419)




Border 1.28780∗∗∗ 1.01828∗∗∗ 0.74908∗∗
(0.36532) (0.37049) (0.36717)
Landlock –0.82442∗∗∗ –0.76846∗∗∗ –0.79178∗∗∗
(0.22817) (0.22929) (0.22735)
Island 0.21579 –0.18572 0.01671
(0.25107) (0.27686) (0.29391)
R2 0.3515 0.3604 0.3087
No. of observations  563   519   500
Note: See table 14.5 notes.
aBecause Hong Kong, Macau, and Singapore appeared on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) list, and Taiwan had no FDI from China, the ChineseLang dummy became irrelevant 
for the sample that excluded oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial center economies.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 6 5
21. Outside China, the Chinese language is used in Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, and 
Taiwan. However, China’s outward FDI in Taiwan was zero due to policy restrictions on the 
part of Taiwan’s government.
22. When the two regression equations use the same set of explanatory variables, the R2 for 
stocks is indeed greater than that for ﬂ  ows.
economies in the world.21 As in other studies, the language variable served 
to capture the impact of common culture and custom, and in the case of 
Hong Kong and Macau, it probably also captured their political aﬃliation 
with China. The host economy’s per capita GDP and its being an island had 
no impact at all.
The estimation results about China’s FDI stocks as contained in table 
14.6 are similar to those contained in table 14.5, with two exceptions: ﬁ  rst, 
real per capita GDP had a signiﬁ  cantly negative impact, suggesting that, in 
the past, China’s FDI tended to be negatively correlated with the level of 
development of the host economies; second, the distance ceased to have any 
signiﬁ  cant impact on China’s FDI. To the extent that FDI ﬂ  ows are more 
volatile than stocks, one could argue on theoretical grounds that the gravity 
model has greater validity for stocks than for ﬂ  ows and, thus, has greater 
explanatory power.22 Hence, the negative relationship between China’s FDI 
and the real per capita GDP of the host economies should not be ignored. 
Nevertheless, the determinants of China’s FDI as revealed in tables 14.5 
and 14.6 should be interpreted with caution because a predominant share 
of the FDI was invested in the world’s tax havens, implying the investment’s 
ultimate destination is to a large extent unknown.
14.6      Determinants of the Outward FDI of the World’s 
Source Economies: Benchmarks for China
On the one hand, because there was a structural change in China’s out-
ward FDI in recent years (e.g., less restrictions due to increased supply of 
foreign reserves, more liberal approval processes, government encourage-
ment, etc.), its past FDI ﬂ  ows from the 1980s would tend to underestimate 
China’s future investment ﬂ  ows. On the other hand, the number of obser-
vations from 2003 to 2006 is too small to make any estimation reliable. An 
alternative approach is to use the experiences of the world’s source econo-
mies at various stages of economic development over a reasonably long 
period of time to explore the determinants of China’s outward FDI. Still 
another approach is to use the experiences of Japan and South Korea, two 
East Asian economies that are more advanced than China in their stages of 
economic development and their overseas investment, as benchmarks for 
China’s past and future FDI.
A question is whether the experience with FDI far in the past is good 
for predicting investment behavior in the future because FDI has become 
increasingly more important in an increasingly globalized world economy. 566        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
23. Data on real GDP before 2004 are obtained from PWT6.2 and that after 2005 from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), while data on population are obtained 
from WDI.
24. The total trade-  GDP ratio of an economy is given by the ratio of the nominal value of 
the sum of its exports and imports to its nominal GDP.
25. The inward FDI ﬂ  ow-  GDP ratio of an economy is given the ratio of the nominal value 
of inward FDI ﬂ  ow to its nominal GDP.
26. Data on foreign reserves, exports, imports, and U.S. CPI are obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF’s IFS statistics, and data on outward FDI ﬂ  ows 
are obtained from the UNCTAD’s FDI database
27. Here we only report the results when TOpen is used as explanatory variable. The results 
with FOpen as an explanatory variable are similar.
The experience of Japan, South Korea, and other leading investor coun-
tries in the world might fail to capture the dynamics of China’s future FDI. 
Another question is whether the experience of the world’s economies is rel-
evant to China’s FDI in view of the fact that the key Chinese investors are 
closely related to various levels of government.
We have no good answers to these two questions. We do not know if the 
key Chinese investors’ relationships with their governments will lead them 
to make more or less FDI than if they were privately owned, and we believe 
that the world’s experience with FDI may contain useful hints about China’s 
future aggregate FDI. In any event, we believe that having some bases of 
benchmarking would seem better than having none at all.
14.6.1      Determinants of FDI Flows for 211 Source Economies
We use a sample of 211 source economies that had the relevant macro-
economic statistics during 1980 to 2005. More speciﬁ  cally, the equation for 
outward FDI is as the following:
log (Fi,t)  1 • log (GDPi,t)  2 • log (PGDPi,t)  3 • log (FRi,t) 
   4 • Openi,t  5 • Depi,t  6 • WTHi,t  6 • t  C,
where Fi,t is source economy i’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow or stock at time t, GDPi,t 
and PGDPi,t are the economy’s real GDP (constant prices: chain series) and 
real per capita GDP,23 FRi,t stands for its foreign reserves, Open stands for 
its degree of openness (which is represented by “trade openness,” TOpen 
 total trade/GDP,24 or “ﬁ  nancial openness,” FOpen  inward FDI ﬂ  ow/
GDP)25, Depi,t  log (Exchi,t) – log (Exchi,t–1) measures the rate of deprecia-
tion of country i’s currency, or the diﬀerence between the current period log 
value of exchange rate (the number of local currency per U.S. dollar) and 
that of the previous period, C is a constant, and WTHi stands for a dummy 
variable associated with the status of tax heaven or oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial center 
but weighted by its relative importance in attracting FDI (i.e., its inward FDI 
divided by the world’s total inward FDI). The variables Fi,t, FRi,t, exports, 
and imports are adjusted with the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) index 
with 2000 as the base year.26
The estimation results are reported in table 14.7.27 They indicate that China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 6 7
both real GDP and real per capita GDP had a signiﬁ  cantly positive impact, 
whereas currency depreciation had a signiﬁ  cantly negative impact on the 
source economies’ outward FDI ﬂ  ows (equivalently, currency revaluation 
had a positive impact on outward FDI). The coeﬃcients for the GDP vari-
ables were similar in magnitude regardless of whether the OECD list of tax 
havens or the IMF list of oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial centers was used. It is interesting 
that the coeﬃcient of real GDP was slightly below unity, but that for per 
capita real GDP was slightly above unity, with the latter suggesting that the 
stage of economic development appeared to be an even more important 
determinant of FDI outﬂ  ows than the size of the source economies.
As expected, the coeﬃcient of foreign reserves was positive. However, 
it was statistically signiﬁ  cant only for FDI ﬂ  ows. The coeﬃcient of open-
ness was signiﬁ  cantly positive for FDI ﬂ  ows, but surprisingly, the coeﬃcient 
for FDI stocks was negative at the 10 percent signiﬁ  cance level when the 
IMF list of oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial centers was used. The coeﬃcients of the tax 
haven dummy variable WTHi, while signiﬁ  cantly positive, had substantially 
diﬀerent sizes depending on the list of tax havens.
Table 14.7  Regression results for source economies’ outward foreign direct 
investment ﬂ  ows and stocks (1980–2005)
Flows Stocks
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
log(GDP) 0.91625∗∗∗ 0.89516∗∗∗ 0.99006∗∗∗ 0.95071∗∗∗
(0.05672) (0.05724) (0.04342) (0.04340)
log(PGDP) 1.18505∗∗∗ 1.22769∗∗∗ 1.06723∗∗∗ 1.12771∗∗∗
(0.06636) (0.06713) (0.04991) (0.049990)
log(FR) 0.14962∗∗∗ 0.11780∗∗ 0.04900 0.01887
(0.04955) (0.04977) (0.03825) (0.03800)
TOpen 0.56185∗∗∗ 0.25752∗ 0.310∗∗∗ –0.18991∗
(0.12659) (0.15622) (0.097993) (0.11861)
Dep –0.70089∗∗∗ –0.71483∗∗∗ –0.30845∗∗∗ –0.31888∗∗∗
(0.12670) (0.12701) (0.09844) (0.09763)
t 0.02066∗∗∗ 0.02217∗∗∗ 0.05892∗∗∗ 0.06201∗∗∗
(0.00799) (0.00805) (0.00593) (0.00590)
WTH (OECD) 808.28124∗∗∗ 488.99461∗∗∗
(156.46368) (111.13303)
WTH (IMF) 67.63911∗∗∗ 103.64531∗∗∗
(17.11093) (13.45273)
R2 0.6128 0.6108 0.6804 0.6856
No. of 
observations  2,088   2,088   2,411   2,411
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. OECD  Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development; IMF  International Monetary Fund.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.568        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
28. Even before the investment company was oﬃcially established, China invested US$3 bil-
lion in the Blackstone Group, a private equity ﬁ  rm, in May 2007. After the subprime debacle 
that hurt many major investment banks, the company invested US$5 billion in Morgan Stanley 
for a 9.9 percent stake.
29. According to PWT6.2, in 2004 China’s real per capita GDP (at Laspeyres constant 
prices) was US$ 5,333, which was close to that of Japan in 1962 (US$ 5,550) and of Korea in 
1983 (US$ 5,457).
After controlling for real GDP, real per capita GDP, foreign reserves, 
openness, currency depreciation, and tax haven status, there remained a 
signiﬁ  cantly positive time trend for both FDI ﬂ  ow and stock, which sup-
ports the hypothesis that FDI becomes increasingly important over time 
for all economies.
In view of the pressure generated by China’s bursting foreign reserves 
(US$1.9 trillion by November 2008) on its money supply and its exchange 
rate, it had been China’s oﬃcial policy to encourage foreign reserves to leave 
the country until the onset of the global ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis of 2008: 
“To open the ﬂ  ood gate,” according to the oﬃcial policy speak. As a result 
of this new policy, there will be a signiﬁ  cant increase in both outward direct 
investment and portfolio investment. So far, there are two major channels of 
“ﬂ  ood letting”: (a) overseas investment by qualiﬁ  ed domestic institutional 
investors (QDII) to initially invest in Hong Kong but ultimately in the entire 
world; (b) overseas investment by a state- owned foreign investment arm called 
China Investment Corporation (CIC), whose initial investment fund was 
US$200 billion.28 China announced in August 2007 that individual Chinese 
citizens would be allowed to invest any amount overseas via Tianjin’s Sea-
shore New Zone and other cities. This policy, popularly dubbed “Hong Kong 
Stocks through Train” that was expected to be extended to investment in the 
rest of the world over time, was later aborted due to internal conﬂ  icts of 
interest and concerns about national ﬁ  nancial security, such as uncontrolled 
capital ﬂ  ight and further weakening of a collapsed Chinese stock market.
With the onset of the biggest ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis since the Great 
Depression in the 1930s and serious losses by CIC, however, Chinese ﬁ  rms 
started to reassess their foreign investment strategies. Whether this will have 
a permanent major negative impact on China’s outward FDI remains to be 
seen.
14.6.2      Determinants of Japan and South Korea’s Aggregate FDI
Japan and Korea are China’s two signiﬁ  cant East Asian neighbors that 
have gone through stages of economic development that China is expected 
to go through in the future. In terms of per capita real GDP, China’s pres-
ent development stage is similar to Japan’s in the 1960s and Korea’s in the 
1980s.29 Thus, Japan and South Korea’s experiences with outward FDI could 
be indicative of the development of China’s future FDI. In section 14.1, we 
noted that Hong and Sun (2004), by comparing growth trends, found that China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 6 9
China’s aggregate FDI outﬂ  ows during 1988 to 2002 were quite similar to 
those of South Korea during the same period and to those of Japan in 1968 
to 1982. Instead of directly comparing growth trends, in this section, we shall 
match China’s stages of economic development as measured by per capita 
real GDP with those of South Korea and Japan.
Figures 14.2 and 14.3 depict, respectively, Japan’s aggregate outward FDI 
ﬂ  ow from 1965 to 2006 and Korea’s aggregate outward FDI ﬂ  ow from 1980 
to 2006. From these ﬁ  gures, we observe that each country experienced two 
high growth periods of outward FDI ﬂ  ow. From 1967 to 1973, Japan’s FDI 
ﬂ  ow increased by about 855 percent (which translated into a compound 
average rate of growth of 45.6 percent per annum), and from 1985 to 1989 
its ﬂ  ow increased by about 380 percent (which translated into a compound 
average rate of growth of 48.0 percent per annum). Similarly, from 1989 
to 1996, Korea’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow increased by about 517 percent (which 
translated into a compound average rate of growth of 29.7 percent per 
annum), and from 2003 to 2006, its ﬂ  ow increased by about 141 percent 
(which translated into a compound average rate of growth of 34.1 per-
cent per annum). Interestingly, Japan’s real per capita GDP (measured at 
Laspeyres constant prices) in 1968, 1973, and 1985 was US$ 9,286; US$ 
13,359; and US$ 17,434, respectively, and Korea’s real per capita GDP 
(at Laspeyres constant prices) in 1989, 1996, and 2003 were US$ 8,689; 
Fig. 14.2    Japan’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow (US$ millions at 2000 constant price), 
1965–2006
Sources: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) and International Financial Statistics 
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US$ 14,115; and US$ 17,595, respectively. For these two countries, US$ 
8,300; US$ 14,200; and US$ 17,000 appeared to be three watersheds of 
outward FDI.
A simplistic idea is that when China’s real GDP reaches these critical 
levels, its FDI may grow at comparable rates. However, because China has 
greater income disparity, and that outward FDI tends to originate mostly 
from the more advanced Chinese regions, even if Japan and Korea’s expe-
riences were to be repeated in China, the watersheds may occur at lower 
levels of real per capita GDP. Moreover, as the extent of globalization in 
the twenty- ﬁ  rst century is greater than that in the 1970s as well as the 1990s, 
China’s FDI may exceed those of Japan and South Korea for the same level 
of real per capita GDP.
As demonstrated in table 14.7, real GDP and real per capita GDP, foreign 
reserves, openness, and currency appreciation had a signiﬁ  cantly positive 
impact on the amount of outward FDI. An examination of the relationship 
between the exchange rate of the Korean won and Korea’s outward FDI 
shows weak correlation between them. In the case of Japan, its ﬁ  rst period 
of rapid growth of outward FDI began in 1968, two years before the yen’s 
appreciation in 1970. Its second period of rapid growth in FDI began in 
1986, in the same year of the beginning of currency appreciation, but its FDI 
started to decrease in 1989 even though the yen reached its highest value in 
1995. Thus, it would seem reasonable not to include currency depreciation 
as an explanatory variable.
Fig. 14.3    Korea’s outward FDI ﬂ  ow (US$ millions at 2000 constant price), 
1980–2006
Sources: Korea Eximbank and IFS; FDI ﬁ  gures were deﬂ  ated by U.S. CPI.
Note: The ﬁ  gure for 1980 stands for the cumulated outward FDI ﬂ  ows up to 1980.China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 7 1
30. Japan’s FDI stock statistics before 1980 are unavailable, making estimation of a similar 
model in FDI stock impossible. The UNCTAD database contains both ﬂ  ow and stock data 
from 1980, whereas data obtained from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) con-
tains only ﬂ  ow data beginning in 1965.
When the explanatory variables foreign reserves and openness were 
included in estimating the determinants of Japanese and South Korean 
FDI ﬂ  ows, the estimation results became unstable, perhaps due to the small 
sample size and the strong correlation among some of the explanatory vari-
ables. Thus, these two variables are excluded. That is, we include only real 
GDP and real per capita GDP as the regressors. To capture the upward 
jumps in Japan and Korea’s outward FDI ﬂ  ows at the critical levels of eco-
nomic development, we need a model in which the coeﬃcient of real per 
capita GDP depends on which of the following four development levels the 
investing country found itself: (0) less than US$ 8,500; (1) between US$ 8,501 
and US$ 14,200; (2) between US$ 14,201 and US$ 17,000; and (3) greater 
than US$ 17,001. More speciﬁ  cally, we estimate the following regression 
model with Japan and Korea’s FDI ﬂ  ow data:30
log (Fi,t)  1 log (GDPi,t)  i  1 • l1 (PGDPi,t)  2 • l2 (PGDPi,t) 
   3 • l3 (PGDPi,t),
where Fi,t is the country i’s FDI ﬂ  ow (measured at constant price) in time t, 
GDPi,t is its real GDP (constant prices: chain series) in time t, i captures 
country i’s ﬁ xed eﬀects, ll(PGDPi,t) is the dummy variable for development 
level l.
The estimation results are given in table 14.8, which shows that the 
coeﬃcient for real GDP was signiﬁ  cantly positive, capturing not only the 
fact that Japan as a bigger country than Korea also invested more than 
Korea, but also that both countries invested more as they grew bigger, hold-
Table 14.8  Regression results of the outward foreign direct investment ﬂ  ows of Japan 










  No. of observations  64  
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
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ing real per capita GDP as given. Among the three dummy variables, only 
that for development level 1 was signiﬁ  cantly positive, implying that reaching 
the per capita real GDP of US$ 8,500 had a statistically signiﬁ  cantly positive 
impact on FDI ﬂ  ows.
If the determinants of outward FDI uncovered in the preceding sections 
are regarded as reliable, then they may be used as two diﬀerent benchmarks 
with which to forecast the amount of Chinese FDI outﬂ  ows in future years 
by incorporating the forecasts of China’s explanatory variables. As stated in 
the preceding, it remains to be seen to whether the 2008 global ﬁ  nancial and 
economic crisis led to a signiﬁ  cant regime change for China’s outward FDI.
14.7      Host Economies, Sector Composition, and Geographical 
Distribution: A Comparison of China against Japan and South Korea
We ﬁ rst analyze the determinants of the amounts of South Korea (1981–
2006) and Japan’s (1965–2004) FDI ﬂ  ows to their diﬀerent host economies 
and compare them with the results for Chinese FDI as contained in table 14.5. 
The regression results for the gravity equation for South Korea and Japan 
are shown in tables 14.9 and 14.10, respectively, with the coeﬃcients for time 
dummies omitted. The common border variable was included for neither 
South Korea (which had common border only with North Korea, an adver-
Table 14.9  Regression results for recipient economies of South Korea’s outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂ  ows (1981–2006)
    Full sample  
Tax haven economies 
(OECD list) excluded  
Oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial 
center economies 
(IMF list) excludeda
log(GDP) 0.62371∗∗∗ 0.67150∗∗∗ 0.73981∗∗∗
(0.03920) (0.04056) (0.04269)
log(PGDP) –0.01846 –0.04520 –0.15548∗∗
(0.06349) (0.06353) (0.06894)
log(dist) –0.46704∗∗∗ –0.50343∗∗∗ –0.30681∗∗∗
(0.08717) (0.08694) (0.09096)
Landlock –0.21794 –0.09816 0.16090
(0.19516) (0.19557) (0.20581)
Island 0.16547 0.25192 0.42101∗∗
(0.15574) (0.15636) (0.16746)
R2 0.2871 0.3033 0.3157
No. of observations  1,334   1,305   1,195
Note: See table 14.5 notes.
aBecause Hong Kong, Macau, and Singapore appeared on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) list, and Taiwan had no FDI from China, the ChineseLang dummy became irrelevant 
for the sample that excluded oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial center economies.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 7 3
31. Japan made signiﬁ  cant investment in Taiwan, Indonesia, and The Philippines.
sary during much of this period), nor Japan (which is an island economy that 
does not share any common border with any other country).
The results for China, South Korea, and Japan are similar in that their 
coeﬃcients for GDP and distance had the same signs. The coeﬃcient of per 
capita GDP was negative for both China and South Korea, but positive for 
Japan, probably reﬂ  ecting the fact that Japan was a more advanced econ-
omy than both China and South Korea in the sample periods. Being a land-
locked host economy was a disadvantage in attracting Chinese and Japa-
nese FDI but not South Korean FDI.31 Finally, being an island economy 
had a signiﬁ  cantly positive impact on attracting Japanese FDI, a less sig-
niﬁ  cantly positive impact on attracting South Korean FDI, and no impact 
on Chinese FDI.
Next, let’s examine the sector composition of Japan and South Korea’s 
FDI ﬂ  ows. Figures 14.4 and 14.5 illustrate the percentages of Japan and 
South Korea’s outward FDI ﬂ  ows in diﬀerent sectors, respectively. Before 
1982, the mining sector was an important target of Japan’s FDI, averaging 
about 20 percent. After that year, the sector’s share fell to below 5 percent. 
South Korea’s experience around 1990 was similar: before 1989, the share 
of investment in the mining sector was more than 10 percent, but it fell to 
Table 14.10  Regression results for recipient economies of Japan’s outward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) ﬂ  ows (1965–2004)
    Full sample  
Tax haven economies 
(OECD list) excluded  
Oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial 
center economies 
(IMF list) excludeda
log(GDP) 0.51785∗∗∗ 0.81830∗∗∗ 0.70191∗∗∗
(0.02779) (0.02870) (0.03248)
log(PGDP) 0.32544∗∗∗ 0.50903∗∗∗ 0.09119∗
(0.04746) (0.04376) (0.05180)
log(dist) –0.57466∗∗∗ –0.82535∗∗∗ –0.41346∗∗∗
(0.08402) (0.07441) (0.08847)
Landlock –0.09821 0.69567∗∗∗ –0.32926∗
(0.15794) (0.14201) (0.18778)
Island 0.73837∗∗∗ 1.21364∗∗∗ 0.85247∗∗∗
(0.11771) (0.10806) (0.13322)
R2 0.2766 0.4515 0.3387
No. of observations  2,014   1,860   1,663
Note: See table 14.5 notes.
aBecause Hong Kong, Macau, and Singapore appeared on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) list, and Taiwan had no FDI from China, the ChineseLang dummy became irrelevant 
for the sample that excluded oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial center economies.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
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about 5 percent by 1994. In contrast, the two countries’ shares of investment 
in the services sector grew gradually over time. After 2000, Japan’s share 
of investment in the services sector was about 50 percent, whereas South 
Korea’s share was about 40 percent.
Notice that the decline of Japan’s FDI in the mining sector occurred in its 
development stage 2 as deﬁ  ned in the previous section, whereas the decline 
of South Korea’s FDI in the same sector occurred right from the beginning 
Fig. 14.4    Japan’s sectoral distribution of outward FDI ﬂ  ows: 1965–2004
Source: JETRO.
Fig. 14.5    Korea’s sectoral distribution of outward FDI ﬂ  ow: 1980–2006
Source: Korea Eximbank.
Note: The ﬁ  gures for 1980 refer to cumulated outward FDI ﬂ  ows up to 1980.China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 7 5
32. This may occur in the early 2010s.
of its development stage 1. Also, South Korea’s high share of FDI in the ser-
vices sector occurred in its development stage 2, whereas Japan’s high share 
of FDI in the same sector occurred long after it entered its development 
stage 3. That is to say, South Korea’s sector composition followed similar 
changes as Japan’s, but the pace of change was much faster, implying that 
there seemed to be less similarity in the two countries’ evolution of their 
sector composition than in the evolution in their aggregate FDI outﬂ  ows. 
A possible explanation is that South Korea’s real per capita GDP reached 
Japan’s level twenty years later, and the more globalized world economy 
by then could have required or permitted greater foreign investment in the 
services industries.
Let us compare China’s sector composition of FDI ﬂ  ow with those of 
Japan and South Korea. In the following ﬁ  gures, we assume that investment 
in ﬁ  nancial industries was one-  sixth of the total FDI ﬂ  ows and stocks in 
2003 to 2005, more or less the ratio observed in 2006. On this assumption, 
during 2003 to 2006, China’s average share of investment in the mining 
sector was 29.8 percent, which was higher than Japan and South Korea’s 
historically high shares. Because China’s present stage of economic develop-
ment is similar to that of Japan in the 1960s and South Korea in the 1980s, 
China’s investment in this sector may continue to grow until China’s real 
per capita GDP reaches the range of US$ 10,000.32 The average share of 
China’s investment in the manufacturing sector during 2003 to 2006 was 12.4 
percent, less than Japan in the 1960s and South Korea in the 1980s. Thus, its 
share in investment in the manufacturing sector may grow further.
Making the same assumption about the shares of FDI in ﬁ  nance during 
2003 to 2005, we see that China’s investment in the services sector during 
2003 to 2006 averaged at 55.5 percent, which was signiﬁ  cantly higher than 
that of Japan and South Korea in the 2000s. Judged against the experiences 
of Japan and South Korea, it seems curious why China’s investment share in 
the services sector was so high, even after account is taken of the fact that the 
world economy in the twenty-  ﬁ  rst century was more services-  oriented than 
in the last century. One may speculate that it was a result of China’s capital 
control policy, which induced Chinese ﬁ  rms to invest in oﬀshore ﬁ  nancial 
centers before they were reinvested elsewhere in other nonservice- related sec-
tors (including “round-  tripping” FDI back to China). Perhaps the fact that 
most of the Chinese investors were SOEs was another reason because they 
might have an incentive to hide their identity and destination of investment 
through companies set up in the tax havens. If Japan and South Korea’s 
sector compositions in outward FDI had predictive value for China’s, how-
ever, then China’s investment share in the services sector may decline over 
time in response to China’s increasing liberalization of its capital accounts 
and as a result of increases in the shares of mining and manufacturing.576        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
Figures 14.6 and 14.7 depict the shares of Japan and South Korea’s FDI 
ﬂ  ow to diﬀerent regions. A comparison of these ﬁ  gures against those for 
China contained in table 14.3 indicates that the share of China’s outward 
FDI ﬂ  ow to Asia in 2003 to 2005 was broadly similar to those of Japan in 
1960s and South Korea in 1980s. However, China’s shares of investment 
Fig. 14.6    Japan’s regional distribution of outward FDI ﬂ  ow: 1965–2004
Source: JETRO.
Fig. 14.7    Korea’s regional distribution of outward FDI ﬂ  ow: 1980–2006
Source: Korea Eximbank.
Note: The ﬁ  gures for 1980 refer to cumulated outward FDI ﬂ  ows up to 1980.China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment    5 7 7
ﬂ  ows to Europe and North America in the same years were much lower than 
those of Japan and South Korea’s in their respective comparable periods. In 
contrast, China’s share of investment ﬂ  ow to Latin America was abnormally 
higher than Japan and South Korea’s due to China’s huge investment in tax 
havens in Latin America.
Japan’s average FDI share in Africa from 1965 to 1985 was 3.6 percent, 
equal to that of China during 2003 to 2006. However, Japan’s share declined 
signiﬁ  cantly after 1985 and reached a negligible 0.3 percent by 2004. Com-
pared with Japan, South Korea’s FDI share in Africa was relatively low in 
the entire period. During 1990 to 1998, its average share was about 2.3 per-
cent. Its African share began to decrease after 1998, and by 2004, it dropped 
to 0.85 percent, which was less than China’s current share. Given Africa’s 
much greater political importance to China than to Japan and South Korea, 
China’s future African shares could easily be much higher than the current 
shares of Japan and South Korea.
14.8      Summary and Direction of Further Research
In this paper, after brieﬂ  y describing China’s “go overseas” policy, we 
have provided a systematic analysis of the size and composition of China’s 
outward FDI in 2003 to 2006, using data provided by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce. In addition, we made an attempt to uncover the determinants 
of the direction and amount of China’s outward FDI and brieﬂ  y described 
China’s foreign direct investment and other forms of overseas cooperation in 
the energy sector. Finally, we also attempted to understand the determinants 
of the world’s source economies’ outward FDI and, in particular, those of 
Japan and South Korea, in order to provide benchmarks for China’s past 
and future outward FDI.
Our empirical analysis of the destination of China’s FDI reveals that the 
real GDP of host economies had a positive impact on the amounts of Chi-
nese FDI ﬂ  ows to and FDI stocks in them. Their real per capita GDP had 
no impact on FDI ﬂ  ows but a negative impact on FDI stocks. Their distance 
from China, sharing a common border and speaking the same language, had 
the expected impact. The empirical analysis of the world’s source econo-
mies reveals that real GDP, real per capita GDP, foreign reserves, currency 
appreciation, and time trend all had a signiﬁ  cantly positive impact on their 
aggregate outward FDI ﬂ  ows and stocks.
One direction of further research is the use of the experience of the world’s 
leading source economies, in particular Japan, South Korea, and major 
emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, and India to forecast China’s 
outward FDI in the future.578        Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma
Nicholas Lardy is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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Comment  Nicholas Lardy
The analysis of Leonard K. Cheng and Zihui Ma is an important addition to 
our understanding of the nature of China’s outbound foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). While outbound FDI from China has grown substantially in 
recent years, it remains far smaller than inward investment ﬂ  ows, and most 
of the existing literature focuses on the latter.
One strength of the analysis of Cheng and Ma is that it relies on FDI data 
that are compiled in accordance with Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) deﬁ  nitions and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) balance of payments guidelines. This is a much more realistic 
approach than the all too prevalent practice of relying on a compilation of 
press reports. Press accounts fail to diﬀerentiate between proposed projects 
and actual ﬂ  ows, fail to recognize that ﬂ  ows for those projects that are under-
taken frequently occur over a period of years, and fail to diﬀerentiate between 
projects ﬁ  nanced with Chinese direct investment from those ﬁ  nanced with 
loans from Chinese ﬁ  nancial institutions.